Abstract. Boolean games are a class of two-player games which may be defined via a Boolean form over a set of atomic actions. A particular game on some form is instantiated by partitioning these actions between the players -player 0 and player 1 -each of whom has the object of employing its available actions in such a way that the game's outcome is that sought by the player concerned, i.e. player i tries to bring about the outcome i. In this paper our aim is to consider a number of issues concerning how such forms are represented within an algorithmic setting. We introduce a concept of concise form representation and compare its properties in relation to the more frequently used "extensive form" descriptions. Among other results we present a "normal form" theorem that gives a characterisation of winning strategies for each player. Our main interest, however, lies in classifying the computational complexity of various decision problems when the game instance is presented as a concise form. Among the problems we consider are: deciding existence of a winning strategy given control of a particular set of actions; determining whether two games are "equivalent".
Introduction
The combination of logic and games has a significant history: for instance, a game theoretic interpretation of quantification goes back at least to the 19th century with C.S. Peirce ([9] ), but it took until the second half of the previous century, when Henkin suggested a way of using games to give a semantics for infinitary languages ( [5] ), that logicians used more and more game-theoretic techniques in their analysis, and that game theoretic versions for all essential logical notions (truth in a model, validity, model comparison) were subsequently developed. In addition, connections between game theory and modal logic have recently been developed.
Where the above research paradigm can be summarised as 'game theory in logic', toward the end of the last decade, an area that could be coined 'logic in game theory' received a lot of attention (we only mention [7] ; the reader can find more references there); especially when this field is conceived as formalising the dynamics and the powers of coalitions in multi-agent systems, this boost in attention can be explained.
Boolean Games, as introduced by Harrenstein et. al ([4] ) fit in this research paradigm by studying two-player games in which each player has control over a set of atomic propositions, is able to force certain states of affairs to be true, but is dependent on the other player concerning the realisation of many other situations. This seems to model a rather general set of multi-agent scenarios, where it is quite common that each agent has its own goals, but, at the same time, only limited control over the resources (the particular propositional variables); at the same time, all two-player games in strategic form can be modelled as such.
The issues treated in [3, 4] , are primarily driven by semantic concerns, thus: presenting inductive definitions of two-player fully competitive games; introducing viable ideas of what it means for two games to be "strategically equivalent"; constructing sound and complete calculi to capture winning strategies; and exploring the logical and algebraic relationship between the game-theoretic formalism and propositional logic functions.
Our concerns in the present paper are two-fold: firstly, we revisit the correspondence between propositional logic functions and Boolean forms presented in [4] under which a given form g involving atomic actions A maps to a propositional function g of the propositional arguments A. We establish a strong connection between the concept of winning strategy in a game and classical representation theorems for propositional functions. Among the consequences following from this connection we may, a. Characterise all winning strategies for either player in a form g in terms of particular representations of g . b. Obtain various "normal form" theorems for Boolean forms. c. Characterise the "minimal winning control allocations" for a player, d. Characterise precisely those forms, g, for which neither player has a winning strategy unless they have control over every atomic action.
Our second and principal interest, however, is to examine the computational complexity of a number of natural decision problems arising in the domain of Boolean game forms. In particular, e. Given a description of a form g and an allocation of atomic actions, σ i , to player i, does σ i give a winning strategy for i? f. Given descriptions of two forms g and h are these strategically equivalent? g. Given a description of some form g, is there any subset of actions with which player i has a winning strategy in g? h. Given g and h together with instantiations of these to games via σ for g and τ for h, are the resulting games -(g, σ) and (h, τ) -"equivalent"?
The computational complexity of these decision problems turns on how much freedom is permitted in representing the forms within an instance of the problem. If we insist on an "extensive form" description then all may be solved by deterministic polynomialtime methods: this bound, however, is polynomial in the size of the instance, which for extensive forms will typically be exponential in the number of atomic actions. If, on the other hand, we allow so-called "concise forms", each of the problems above is, under the standard assumptions, computationally intractable, with complexities ranging from np-complete to completeness for a class believed to lie strictly between the second and third levels of the polynomial hierarchy.
As one point of interest we observe that the classification results for the problems described by (e)-(g) are fairly direct consequences of the characterisations given by (a) and (b). The constructions required in our analysis of the "game equivalence" problem (h) are, however, rather more intricate and we omit the details of this.
In total these results suggest a trade-off between extensive, computationally tractable descriptions that, in general, will be unrealistically large and concise descriptions for which decision methods for those questions of interest are unlikely to be viable. It may, however, be the case that this apparent dichotomy is not as clearly defined as our results imply: we show that there are natural questions which even in terms of extensive forms are computationally intractable.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review the definitions of Boolean form, game and "winning strategy" originating in [3, 4] . In Section 3 we examine the relationship between forms and propositional functions from [4] and show that this can be used to characterise winning strategies as well as yielding various "normal form" representations for Boolean forms. We then introduce the ideas that form the central concern of this paper, namely the notion of concise form descriptions, and discuss the properties of these in relation to extensive forms. We continue this analytic comparison in Section 5, wherein various decision problems are defined and classified with respect to their computational complexity. The final section outlines some directions for further research.
Boolean Forms and Games
Definition 1. (Harrenstein et al. [4] ) Let A = {a 1 , . . . , a n } be a (finite) set of atomic actions and G A the smallest set that satisfies both: Given some Boolean form g ∈ G A , we may think of g depicted as a binary tree so that: if g ∈ {0, 1}, then this tree is a single vertex labelled with the relevant outcome 0 or 1; if g = α(g 0 , g 1 ) this tree comprises a root labelled with the action α one of whose out-going edges is directed into the root of the tree for g 0 , with the other out-going edge directed into the root of the tree for g 1 . An outcome of α(g 0 , g 1 ) is determined by whether the action α is invoked -in which event play continues with g 0 -or abstained from -resulting in play continuing from g 1 . Thus given some subset s of A, and the form g, the outcome sf (g)(s) (the "strategic form" of [4] ) resulting from this process is inductively defined via
The forms g and h ∈ G A are regarded as strategically equivalent (g ≡ sf h) if for every choice s ⊆ A it holds that sf (g)(s) = sf (h)(s).
We note one important feature of this model is its requirement that having committed to playing or refraining from playing an action α the player allocated control of α does not subsequently reverse this choice. In consequence it may be assumed in terms of the binary tree presentation of forms that a path from the root to an outcome contains at most one occurrence of any atomic action.
Given an instantiation of g to a game g, σ the aim of player i is to choose for each action, α, within its control, i.e. in the set σ i , whether or not to play α. Thus a strategy for i in g, σ can be identified as the subset of σ i that i plays. This gives rise to the following definition of winning strategy in [4] . The basic definition of Boolean form is extended by introducing a number of operations on these. 
Definition 2. A player i ∈ {0, 1} has a winning strategy in the game g, σ if there is a subset ν of σ i such that regardless of which instantiation
Informally we may regard the operations of Definition 3 in terms of transformations effected on the associated binary tree form describing g. Thus, g + h is the form obtained by replacing each 0 outcome in g with a copy of h; g · h that resulting by replacing each 1 outcome in g with a copy of h; and g the form in which 0 outcomes are changed to 1 and vice-versa. The operation ⊗ is rather more involved, however, the form resulting 
Each form g may be associated with a propositional function, g with arguments A so that g [s] = 0 if and only if sf (g)(s) = 0 (where for a propositional function f (X) and Q ⊆ X, f [Q] denotes the value of the function f under the instantiation x := 1 if x ∈ Q, x := 0 if x ∈ Q). For g and h forms in G
A g ≡ sf h ⇔ g ≡ h
Characterising Winning Strategies
We recall the following standard definitions concerning propositional logic functions. 
We require some further notation in order to describe the main results of this section.
Definition 5. For a form g ∈ G
Thus, W i (g) is the set of allocations (σ i ) paired with winning strategies for i in these (ν), while M i (g) is the subset of these in which σ i is a minimal control allocation for i. Now consider the set of play choices, P(A), given by
and define a (bijective) mapping, Lits, between these and well-formed literal sets over the propositional variables {a 1 , . . . , a n } by
We now obtain, 
Proof. Both are immediate from Theorem 1 and the fact that every propositional function f (X n ) is equivalent to formulae described by the disjunction of product terms matching (prime) implicants and the conjunction of clause terms matching (prime) implicates. 2
Corollary 2. For any set A
(n) = {a 1 , . . . , a n } of n atomic actions, there are (modulo strategic equivalence) exactly two g ∈ G A (n) with the property that neither player has a winning strategy in the game g, σ unless σ i = A (n) . Thus, with these two exceptions, in any g at least one of the players can force a win without having control over the entire action set.
Proof. We first show that there are at least two such cases.
Consider the form, Par n ∈ G A (n) , inductively defined as
Then, it is easy to show that Par n ≡ a 1 ⊕ a 2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ a n , where ⊕ is binary exclusive or. This function, however, cannot have its value determined by setting any strict subset of its arguments, i.e. i has a winning strategy only if i has control over the entire action set A (n) . The second example class is obtained simply by considering Par n . To see that there at most two cases, it suffices to note that if f (A (n) ) ≡ Par n and f (A (n) ) ≡ ¬ Par n then there is either a prime implicate or prime implicant of f that depends on at most n − 1 arguments. Theorem 1(c-d) presents an appropriate winning strategy in either case.
Representation Issues -Concise Versus Extensive
Representational issues are one aspect that must be considered in assessing the computational complexity of particular decision problems on Boolean forms/games: thus one has a choice of using extensive forms whereby g ∈ G A is described in terms of Definition 1(a,b) or, alternatively, in some "concise" form, e.g. g ∈ G A is described by its construction in terms of the operations in Definition 3. Formally,
Definition 6. A game g ∈ G A , is described in extensive form if it is presented as a labelled binary tree T (V , E) each internal vertex of which is labelled with some a i ∈ A and whose leaves are labelled with an outcome from the set {0, 1}. The size of an extensive form representation T of g, denoted S ext (g, T ) is the total number of internal vertices in T , i.e. the number of occurrences of atomic strategy labels.
A game g ∈ G A is described in concise form if given as a well-formed expression in the language L A defined as follows:
. For each θ ∈ {+, ·}, and F, G ∈ L
A , F θ G ∈ L A . d. For each F, G, H ∈ L A , ⊗(F, G, H) ∈ L A . e. For each F ∈ L A , F ∈ L A f. For each F ∈ L A , (F) ∈ L A (bracketing). g
. F ∈ L A if and only if F is formed by a finite number of applications of the rules (a)-(f).

The size of a concise representation, F of g, denoted S con (F, g) is the total number of applications of rule (b) used to form F.
It will be useful, subsequently, to consider the following measures in capturing ideas of representational complexity.
Definition 7. For g ∈ G A , the extensive complexity of (the class) [g] is, S ext ([g]) := min {S ext (h, T ) : T is an extensive representation of h with g ≡ sf h}
Similarly, the concise complexity of (the class) [g] , is
is a concise representation of h with g ≡ sf h}
A significant difference between extensive and concise descriptions of g ∈ G A is that the latter may be exponentially shorter (in terms of n = |A|) than the former, even for quite "basic" game forms. Thus we have the following result concerning these measures, Proposition 1.
a. For all g ∈ G
(n) denote the set of atomic strategies {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n }. There is a sequence {g (n) } of forms with g (n) ∈ G A (n) for which:
|A| − 1 it suffices to observe that in any extensive representation of h for which g ≡ sf h no atomic strategy α ∈ A need occur more than once on any path leading from the root to a leaf. Thus each path contains at most |A| distinct labels. Since the representation is a binary tree the upper bound is immediate. b. Use the form Par n of Corollary 2 whose concise form complexity is 2n − 1 1 . It may be shown that a minimal extensive form representation of Par n must be a complete binary tree of depth n. 2 We can, in fact, obtain a rather stronger version of Proposition 1(a), by considering another idea from the study of propositional logic functions, namely: 
From this,
Proposition 2. For all g ∈ G
Proof. (outline) a. Suppose T is a minimal size extensive representation of g ∈ G A . It must be the case that for i ∈ {0, 1}, T has at least R i ( g ) leaves labelled with the outcome i. For if this failed to be the case for i = 0 say, then from Theorem 1(a) we could construct a covering set of implicates for g via the choice of actions on each path from the root of T to an outcome 0: this covering set, however, would contain fewer than R 0 ( g ) implicates. We deduce that T has at least R 0 ( g ) + R 1 ( g ) leaves and hence, R 0 ( g ) + R 1 ( g ) − 1 internal vertices. b. Consequence of Corollary 1.
2
We note that Proposition 2(a) implies the first part of Propostion 1(b) since R 0 ( Par n ) = R 1 ( Par n ) = 2 n−1 .
Decision Problems for Boolean Games
Given a description of some Boolean game (g, σ), probably the most basic question one would be concerned with is whether one or other of the players can force a win with their allotted set of actions, σ i . Similarly, if one is just presented with the form g ∈ G A , 1 A similar result can be shown even if the concise form representation may only use the operations {+, ·, }. The gap between S ext (g (n) ) and S con {+,·, } (g (n) ), however, is not fully exponential in
a player may wish to discover which subset of A it would be beneficial to gain control of, since it would admit a winning strategy in g. We note that our notion of "winning strategy" for i using a set of actions σ i has one consequence: if σ i admits a winning strategy for i in g, then any superset of σ i also admits a winning strategy for i. From this observation it follows that in order to decide if i has any winning strategy in g it suffices to determine if setting σ i = A, that is giving i control of every atomic action, admits such. As well as these questions concerning two different aspects of whether one player has the capability to win a game, another set of questions arises in determining various concepts of games being "equivalent". At one level, we have the idea of strategic equivalence: thus deciding of given forms g and h in G A whether these are strategically equivalent. The concept of strategic equivalence, however, is in some ways rather too precise: there may be forms g and h which, while not strategically equivalent, we may wish to regard as "equivalent" under certain conditions, for example if it were the case that particular instantiations of g and h as games were "equivalent" in some sense. Thus, Harrenstein (personal communication), has suggested a concept of two Boolean games -g, σ and h, τ -being equivalent based on the players being able to bring about "similar" outcomes: the formal definition being presented in terms of a "forcing relationship" similar in spirit to those introduced in [2, 8] . We may very informally describe this notion as follows, The relationship between ≡ H and ≡ g described in Lemma 1 merits some comment. Certainly it is clear that ≡ g does not capture the entire class of equivalent games within the sense of being able to "enforce similar outcomes" defined in ≡ H . There is, however, a simple mechanism by which those missed can be recovered, i.e. by requiring the additional condition g,σ ≡ g h,τ to hold. We have interpreted g, σ ≡ g h, τ as "player i can force a win in g, σ if and only if player i can force a win in h, τ ". In this light, g,σ ≡ g h,τ indicates "player i can force their opponent to win in g, σ if and only if player i can force their opponent to win in h, τ ". In passing we observe that while "forcing one's opponent to win" may seem rather eccentric, examples of problems involving such strategies are well-known, e.g. "self-mate" puzzles in Chess. In total the view of game equivalence engendered by the "traditional" notion of state-to-outcomeset relationship, is identical to an arguably rather more intuitive notion of equivalence, namely: for each possible choice of i and j, player i can force a win for player j in g, σ if and only if player i can force a win for player j in h, τ .
The formal definition of the decision problems examined in the remainder of this section is given below.
-Winning Strategy (ws)
Instance: a game g, σ ; set A of atomic strategies, a player i ∈ {0, 1}. Question: Does i have a winning strategy in the game (g, σ)? -Equivalence (equiv)
Instance: forms g, h ∈ G A . Question: Is it the case that g ≡ sf h, i.e. are g and h strategically equivalent? -Win Existence (we)
Instance: a form g ∈ G A and a player i ∈ {0, 1}. Question: Is there some set of actions with which i has a winning strategy? -Game Equivalence (ge) Instance: two games g, σ , h, τ with g ∈ G A , h ∈ G B . Question: Is it the case that g, σ ≡ g h, τ , i.e. are g, σ and h, τ equivalent games?
We note that our definitions have not specified any restrictions on how a given form is described within an instance of these decision problems. We have, as noted in our discussion opening Section 4 above, (at least) two choices: allow g ∈ G A to be described using an equivalent concise form, F g ; or insist that g is presented as an extensive form, T g . One difference that we have already highlighted is that the space required for some descriptions F g may be significantly less than that required for the minimum extensive form descriptions of g. While this fact appears to present a powerful argument in favour of employing concise form descriptions, our first set of results indicate some drawbacks. If q is a decision problem part of the instance for which is a Boolean form, we shall use the notation q c to describe the case which permits concise representations and q e for that which insists on extensive form descriptions. 
Informally, oba asks of a given extensive form whether it is possible to construct a smaller equivalent form. An immediate consequence of [6] is that oba is np-hard.
Conclusions and Further Work
Our principal goal in this paper has been to examine the computational complexity of a number of natural decision problems arising in the context of the Boolean game formalism from [3, 4] . Building from the correspondence between the underlying forms of such games and propositional functions we can characterise winning strategies and their structure for any game. Using the operational description developed in [4] allows a precise formulation for the concept of "concise form" to be defined in contrast to the usual idea of "extensive form". We have indicated both advantages and drawbacks with both approaches so that the apparent computational tractability of extensive forms is paid for in terms of potentially exponentially large (in the number of atomic actions) descriptions; on the other hand, while the concise forms may admit rather terser descriptions of a given game all four of the basic decision questions raised are unlikely to admit feasible algorithmic solutions.
We conclude by, briefly, summarising some potential developments of the ideas discussed above. We have already noted that our concept of "game equivalence" -≡ g is defined independently of ideas involving the "forcing relations" of [2, 8] [4] and thus, it would be of some interest to determine whether deciding g, σ ≡ H h, τ is p One final issue concerns the algebraic relationship between forms and propositional functions. Our analysis in Section 3 could be viewed as relating winning strategies in g to terms occurring in a "standard" representation of g over the complete logical basis {∧, ∨, ¬}. An alternative complete logical basis is given by {∧, ⊕, } ( being the nullary function evaluating to true) within which a normal form theorem holds, i.e. the ringsum expansion of Zhegalkin [11] , see, e.g. [1, p. 14]: it is unclear, but may be of some interest, to what extent terms within this descriptive form correspond to properties of winning strategies.
